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Weighing Contacts in Conflicts Cases:
The Handmaiden Axiom
Courtland H. Peterson*
John Shaposka, a resident of Delaware, offered Michael Cipolla a ride
to Michael's home in Pennsylvania after their classes in a Delaware
school were ended for the day. Michael accepted and was injured when
the automobile, driven by John and owned by John's father, was involved in a collision while still in Delaware. Delaware has a statute barring recovery against a host who was only ordinarily negligent, while
Pennsylvania has no guest statute. Michael and his parents sued John in
Pennsylvania, apparently urging only that John was guilty of ordinary
negligence. Recovery could therefore be had only if the Pennsylvania
court applied forum law rather than Delaware law. Defendant's motion
for summary judgment was granted by the trial court and the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania affirmed.'
The majority opinion in Cippolla v. Shaposka, written by Justice
Cohen for himself and four other justices, concluded that a true conflict
was presented but that the interests of Delaware were both qualitatively
and quantitatively superior to those of the forum. 2 In addition, relying
on the work of Professor Cavers, 3 Justice Cohen suggested that ".

.

. it

seems only fair to permit a defendant to rely on his home state law when
he is acting within that state."'4 Chief Justice Bell concurred on the
traditional grounds he had already urged in his dissent in Griffith v.
United Airlines,5 suggesting that the question ought to be resolved on
the theory of lex loci delicti. 6 Justice Roberts dissented, drawing on
Dean Pedrick's criticism of guest statutes, 7 and concluded that where
truly conflicting interests of states are evenly balanced the conflict
8
should be resolved by the 'better' (no-guest-statute) rule.
Putting to one side Justice Roberts' reliance on the "better law" ap* Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law.
1. Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 569, 267 A.2d 854 (1970).
2. Id., 267 A.2d at 856, 857.
3. D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS (1965).
4. 267 A.2d at 856.
5. 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796, 807 (1964).
6. 267 A.2d at 857.
7. Pedrick, Taken for a Ride: The Automobile Guest and Assumption of Risk, 22
LA. L. REV. 90 (1961).
8. 267 A.2d at 857, 862.
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proach, it is difficult to find fault with the outcome of the case. Not
only the orthodox place-of-harm choice rule but indeed much of
modern conflicts theory can be argued in support of this result. Thus
it seems clear that on this distribution of contacts the approach of the
Second Restatement would indicate application of the Delaware guest
statute.9 Presumably Professor Ehrenzweig would agree, however unsympathetic he may be toward the Restatement, since Delaware was
the place where the car was garaged and insured." As already noted,
Professor Cavers directly anticipated this kind of problem in his discussion of "Principles of Preference", and would advocate application of
the Delaware rule."i An approach to the problem based on the "governmental interest analysis" of the late Professor Currie might well conclude, as the court did, that both states have an "interest".1 2 Even so, it
seems quite likely that Currie himself might have sought to avoid the
conflict through a "restrained and enlightened interpretation" of the
Pennsylvania law, thus deferring to the more clearly defined interest of
Delaware.' 3 The "functional analysis" of Professors von Mehren and
Trautman could also reach the same result, either on the conclusion
that Delaware was "predominantly concerned" or by construction of a
Pennsylvania "regulating rule" coincident with the reference-to-forumlaw rule which a Delaware court would almost certainly construct. 4 To
round off this sampler of theories it should also be noted that an
analysis of Dean Leflar's "choice-influencing considerations" may lend
support to the Cippolla result, notwithstanding inclusion of the "better
law" consideration which led Justice Roberts to dissent.' 5 Indeed, in
9. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 comment e; § 146 (Proposed
Official Draft Pt. II, 1968).
10. A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 580 (1962).
11. D. CAVERS, supra note 3, at 146-47.
12. A perhaps too literal reading of Currie's earlier work seems to suggest that the
forum acquired a ". . definite and legitimate interest in the application of its policy" to
a tort case, "...
if both parties-or even the plaintiff alone-were residents of, or

domiciled in ....

" the forum, B. CURRIE, Displacement of the Law of the Forum, in
61 (1963) (hereinafter cited as COLLECTEI

COLLECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

ESSAYS).

13. Cf. Kay, Book Review, 18 J. LEG. ED. 341, 346-47 (1966), suggesting that Currie
might well have preferred the dissent in Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Ore. 1, 395 P.2d 543
(1964). Professor Kay relies, quite properly I think, on Currie's candid admiration for
Justice Traynor's enlightened interpretation of forum interest in Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55
Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961). See B. CURRIE, Justice Traynor and the
Conflict of Laws, in COLLECTED ESSAYS 688-89 n-236; Currie, The Disinterested Third State,
28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 754, 757-58 (1963).
14. See A. VON MEHREN AND D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 76-77
(1965).
15. Compare the analysis of Balts v. Balts, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966), in R.
LELAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 136 (1968), concluding that predictability with respect
to intrafamily immunity had minimal bearing, interstate orderliness and ease of administra-
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view of his doubt that mere domicile of a party gives rise to a governmental interest, Leflar might well deny that Pennsylvania had any interest to protect.1 6
Even if the result of Cipolla is thus not likely to be sharply disputed,
some interest in the decision may be engendered by its rationale. As
with many modern cases, no specific theory or doctrine is expressly
adopted by the majority opinion, although it is clear that Justice Cohen
purports to use a policy-oriented approach as opposed to purely mechanical, jurisdiction-selective rules. His terminology reflects the work of
several conflicts scholars in addition to Cavers: thus "interest" (Currie),
"contacts" (Restatement Second), and "concerned jurisdiction" (von
Mehren and Trautman). This catholic caution is balanced by some
candor, however, in the admission that the rule permitting a defendant
to rely on his home state law when acting within that state ".

.

.is...

a highly territorial approach .... ."17 Justice Cohen concludes that "The
very use of the term true conflict implies that there is no one correct
answer, but as a general approach a territorial view seems preferable
[sic] to a personal view."' 8
This recognition of an underlying territorial theory raises the aspect
of the Cipolla decision on which the following brief comment is offered.
Stated somewhat differently, what is posed is the apparent dilemma of a
policy-oriented choice process which must operate within a federal
system organized on a territorial basis. Currie saw this dilemma
as essentially a political problem, in which resolution of conflict through the establishment of a unitary legal system, quite apart
from its immediate impracticality, would devaluate the good we attribute to local self-determination.' 9 Moreover, Currie was faithful to
the logic which this perception of federalism implies, namely by defining "true conflict" between the interests of several states as precisely
tion were not problems, and thus the common family domicile in the forum was of
prime importance as a genuine governmental interest, bolstered by the "better" (no
immunity) rule of the forum. But even if a no-guest-statute rule is "better law," the
forum in Cipolla could easily find predictability with respect to insurance a more potent
factor, the guest rule as easy to administer, and "deference to the primarily concerned
state" a proper choice objective in the search for interstate order. Cf. id., § 107 at 248-49.
Moreover, Leflar suggests weighing the 'better rule' consideration with considerable
caution. Id., § 110 at 259.
16. R. LEFLAR, supra note 15, § 109 at 253. But cf. R. WEiNTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE
CONtrLCr OF LAWS 249 at ftnt. 88a (1971) (suggests that Pennsylvania might have an interest
as domicile and intended destination).
17. 267 A.2d at 857.
18. Id.
19. B. CutruE, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, in Couicram
ESSAYS 177, 179.
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that situation which will not yield to rational resolution by a state court
through a choice process based on the evaluation of underlying policy. 0
Currie's solution, of course, was a resort to forum law if the forum were
an interested state.
In these terms Justice Cohen, having found a "true conflict," would
be obligated to ignore the Delaware rule, or at least to concede that
resort to Delaware law was arbitrary if not irrational. It seems improbable that his comment about the absence of any 'one correct answer' 2 s
was intended to go so far. Instead, particularly in light of his reference
to a qualitative superiority of Delaware's contacts, it appears that Justice
Cohen and the majority of his brethren accept Currie's invaluable contribution to false problem analysis, but also accept the "weighing" of
contacts which was anathema to Currie. 22
In doing so the Pennsylvania Court is in good company, 23 and in this
sense the Cipolla decision seems fairly representative of the shape of an
open-ended but still reasonably cohesive American conflicts theory now
beginning to emerge. Currie was surely right in regarding the territorialist division of legal systems as political, producing a problem of
the separation of powers. But in his insistence that interstate policyweighing is a governmental function of a non-judicial order 24 he seems
to have mistaken the nature of the pressures upon American judges to
engage in just such political decision-making. Justice Cohen does not
articulate these pressures, nor does he fully articulate the weighing
process by which the superiority of the Delaware interest was deter20. E.g., B. CURRiE, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method,
in COLLECrED ESSAYS 77, 106-10, 117.

21. See text at note 18, supra.
22. B. CuRR, supra note 19, at 182; B. CuRRIz, The Constitution and the "Transitory"
Cause of Action, in COLLEED ESSAYS 281, 357; B. CURmt, The Verdict of Quiescent Years,
in COLLECTr ESSAYS 584, 603-05.
23. Cf. R. Weintraub, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICt OF LAws 203 (1971), rejecting the

term "weighing" as the "loosest of metaphors" but suggesting that "In the true conflict
situation . . . viewing the entire matter at issue with circumspection and common sense
will very often suggest a resolution of the conflict that is fair and impartial-the preferred
national solution to an interestate conflict problem." See generally R. LEFLAR, AMEICAN
CONFLiCTs LAw (1968). It is clear that many reputable courts have begun to use the
'weighing' process during the last decade. The decisions in New York and Wisconsin are
especially illustrative, and are too well known to require citation.
24. Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAw & CoNm'p. PROB. 754, 758 (1963).
In the same context, commenting on his own view of the separation of powers, Currie
said:
This has been an unpopular suggestion . .. . At one time it loomed as the most
controversial aspect of governmental-interest analysis. So far as I am concerned, it
lost most of its controversial character and most of its interest some time back.
Id. at 758-59.
One can only remark that Currie's early perception of the importance of this concept
to the rest of his theory was probably correct, and it is thus a pity that his interest in it
waned.
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mined. But even in this laconism Cipolla is representative of many
modern opinions, and it therefore may be fair to use this case as the
occasion for a brief re-examination of Currie's concern about the propriety of conflicts policy evaluation in the state courts.
Currie's own statement is worth repeating, to put the matter in
perspective:
It is no part of the duty of a court to subordinate domestic interests
to those of a foreign state. The conflict must remain unresolved,
unless it can be resolved by political action. Resolution of a conflict between the interests of co-ordinate states is a function of25a
high political order, which courts are not equipped to perform.
His further comments on this theme may, I hope fairly, be summarized
as follows. Notwithstanding a pervasive distrust of the legislative
process, apparent throughout the literature on conflict of laws, this is
our system and we must take its faults (including unresolved conflict)
in the bargain with its virtues. 26 Legislative intervention in conflicts
matters ought to be ad hoc rather than systematic, but this does not mean
"... that courts rather than state legislatures should predominantly
determine the reach of state policy and interest .... "On this theory a court is and should remain a mere handmaiden to
the legislature, implementing as best it can the legislative will. It is to
have some latitude, indeed a considerable latitude, in this process of
implementation. Not only is the role to be creative, and not only is the
interpretation of the legislative will to be teleological rather than mechanical, but a court may even moderate the impact of local legislative
purpose through restrained and enlightened interpretation of forum
2
interests to avoid conflicts with foreign interests.
Central to this approach is what I have called, for want of any more
descriptive name, the Handmaiden Axiom. It is important to recognize
that this Axiom, as Currie used it, is not simply another name for the
theory which subordinates the judicial to the legislative function within
the framework of the separation powers. The Axiom is, rather, a very
special application of that theory, even more restrictive than the category of conflicts cases. Certainly the broad proposition that judges are
usually subordinate to legislatures in our legal system is much too
25.

Id. at 758.

Cf. B. CURRIE, The Verdict of Quiescent Years, in
27. B. CURRIE, supra note 24, at 761.
28. Id. at 757, 762.
26.
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imprecise to be of much help in determining when a court must apply
forum law or when it may ignore it. It is in the possible gradations of
meaning within the generalization about judicial subordination that
real controversy lies.
One way to identify the meaning of the Axiom is to conceive the
concept of judicial subordination as a principle to be defended, with
various lines of defense around it. Taken in this light the inner bastion
can be seen as one about which there is no controversy: If a legislature
lays down a statutory choice rule the courts of that state are bound to
implement it, whether the judges think it wise or not, subject only to
constitutional limits.2 9 There is simply no argument about this aspect of
the concept, although it does pose some interesting possibilities if the
case to which such a statute is clearly applicable would otherwise be
regarded as a false conflict.
A second (middle) line of defense is built on the site where the
legislature has made a clear policy determination which, although not
couched in choice-of-law terms, is clearly expressed as a policy so strong
as to overshadow competing policies. Again subject to constitutional
limits, this line is clearly defensible so long as the case in question
presents a true conflict.
A third (outer) line may be drawn where the legislature has expressed
a clear policy determination but has not provided any clue as to whether
the policy is to be regarded as applicable to multi-state cases. This position, if I understand the theory correctly, is one which the governmental interest analysts must defend to the last man if they are to be
True Believers. 0 That is to say, if there is a substantial domestic policy
which would be sacrificed by the non-application of forum law, then
forum law must be applied even if the legislative expression of this
interest does not reflect an intention to make it an overriding consideration. Whether or not this position is defensible as a principle is, I
believe, the crux of the controversy, and it is this point of the judicial
subordination concept that is referred to here as the Handmaiden
Axiom. 1
29. Cf. Baade, Counter-Revolution or Alliance for Progress? Reflections on Reading
Cavers, The Choice-of-Law Process, 46 Tnx. L. REv. 141, 150-51 (1967); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLiCr OF LAWS § 6(1) (Proposed Official Draft Pt. I, 1967).
30. The term is that of Baade, supra note 29, at 151, whose whole article makes it
amusingly clear that governmental-interest analysis is not a theory but a religion. Old
conflicts dogma has often been excoriated in ecclesiastical terms, and perhaps continuation
of the practice should be encouraged: If Currie was the Luther of the Reformation, then
surely Cavers must be its Wesley. And who can doubt the ecumenicalism of the Second
Restatement?
31. It should be apparent that governmental-interest analysis, as Currie and Baade have
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Probably the most elusive aspect of Currie's theory is that which
permits flexibility through "restrained and enlightened interpretation"
of forum interests. A judge so inclined could clearly use this notion to
escape application of domestic rules simply by refusing to recognize
that a substantial forum interest exists, but it seems clear that Currie
and his disciples have not intended any such weasel-worded understanding of this device. If I read them correctly what they mean instead is
that there is still another defense of the judicial subordination ideanot a line of defense as such, but rather outposts which would be
manned if no enemy were in sight. There are, in other words, cases
where an applicable policy discoverable in the domestic law would be
given effect if the case were purely domestic, but the forum interest in
question is not so compelling as to demand application in multistate
cases. In such situations the judge may sacrifice the (insubstantial)
32
forum interest in favor of a strong foreign interest.
To concede that the judge may abandon the outpost with honor is
not, however, to suggest that he may retreat beyond the outer line of
defense. In short, the Currie view of "restrained and enlightened interpretation" permits the judge to consider the advisability of sacrificing
insubstantial forum interests under the pressure of clearly substantial
foreign interests. But the judge who has backed up to the point where
a substantial forum interest is at stake can retreat no further, regardless
of the substantiality of competing foreign interests.
In earlier writings Currie divided the cases into only two categories,
false problems and true conflicts. In his later work he distinguished
three classes of cases: (1) false problems, (2) cases where reasonable
minds might differ as to whether a conflicting interest should be
asserted, and (3) intractable problems which can be solved only by
political action.8 3 He recognized the second class as presenting real
problems, but seems to have avoided calling these cases "true conflicts'.1 84 The name "true conflict" for all cases where interests can be
identified as squarely opposing seems clearer to me, whether the interused the term, does not distinguish between these second and third lines of defense. For
them these are by definition indistinguishable, because they view any substantial interest
of the forum as an over-riding interest. Cf. text inJra, at note 33. The realities of judicial
opinion-writing also blur the distinction, since the draftsman is likely to emphasize the
dominance of the policy if he really finds it to be over-riding, and he is sorely tempted
to strengthen his conclusion by hyperbole even if he does not.
32. See the Currie articles cited supra at notes 12, 13, 19, 20, 22, 24 passim.
33. Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoB. 754, 763-64 (1963).
34. But cf. Cavers, The Changing Choice-oI-Law Process and the Federal Courts, 28
LAw & CoTrrMP. PROB. 732, 733 n.4 (1963).

442

Symposium on Cipolla v. Shaposka
ests involved are "substantial" or not, but the terminology is not too
important. What seems to me to be crucial, however, is the distinction
between a domestic interest which is overriding because the legislature
has made it so, as opposed to an interest deemed by the governmentalinterest analysts to be overriding simply because it is a forum interest
and a substantial one. Cavers foresaw the possibility that ".... only a
little oversimplification... [would cast Currie as an advocate] of applying forum law simply because it is forum law."3' 5 I hope I make no
such mistake. But it seems not unwarranted to regard governmentalinterest analysis as requiring application of forum law for its own sake
when the interest thus implemented is substantial.
I do not mean to suggest that the problem reduces itself to anything
so simple as a characterization of interests as "substantial" or "insubstantial"; obviously the question is much more complex than that.
What I do suggest, returning to Cipolla and laconic cases like it, is that
for precedential purposes the articulation of the process of determining
substantiality is no easier than that of "weighing" interests. Moreover,
as Professor Cavers remarked long ago,88 Currie's own approach invites
judicial interest-weighing by permitting the forum court to take into
account the policy of another state in the determination of whether or
not there is a true conflict. I find Currie's response to that comment
singularly unpersuasive:
S.. [T]hough the function is essentially the same, there is an
important difference between a state's construing domestic law
with moderation in order to avoid conflict with a foreign interest
and its holding that the foreign interest is paramount. When a
court avowedly uses the tools of construction and interpretation
it invites legislative correction of error-or at least criticism from
the law reviews. When it weighs state interests and finds a foreign
interest weightier it inhibits legislative intervention and confounds criticism.8 7

As a defense or even a partial defense of the Handmaiden Axiom it
seems clear that this argument simply will not wash. What most probably inhibits criticism is not the process itself, whether it be the process
of interpreting domestic interests or that of weighing these against
foreign interests, but rather the difficulty of articulating either in a way
which permits them to be subjected to close analysis. As to the question
35. D. CAvEts, Tii CHOICE-OF-LAW PRocEss 86 (1965).
36. Cavers, supra note 34.
37. Currie, supra note 33, at 759.
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of legislative correction it should first of all be observed that those few
statutes enacted for the purpose of overruling cases are often, if not
usually, addressed to the result of a case rather than to its specific
rationale. How is the reuslt of a publicly unacceptable "weighing" any
more obscure than that of a publicly unacceptable interpretation?
Indeed, the argument at this point arrives at self-contradiction. A
legislature disturbed because a judicial decision of its own courts
sacrifices local to foreign interests can move directly to remedy the
situation. A decision preferring a local (even though substantial) interest to an obviously stronger foreign interest, on the other hand, is likely
to cause a public outcry in the foreign state and thus to generate pressure for legislative reform only in a legislature to which the court of
decision is not responsible. Statutory "correction" in that event would
probably take the form of retaliatory legislation against the offending
forum, and lead to that very parochialism which "restrained and
enlightened interpretation" understandably seeks to avoid.Y8
At bottom the relative rarity of legislative intervention in conflict
resolution is more realistically attributable to either both of two quite
different causes. First, the evaluation of interests in particular cases,
whether domestic or multistate, seldom adversely affects enough people
to produce sufficient pressure for legislative change. Secondly, more
optimistically, legislative abstention from the field may reflect a wise
recognition that statutory choice determinations often produce mechanical and irrational results, as well as infringements on the legitimate
interests of sister states which are at best parochial and at worst invite
retaliation.89 Whichever of these causes is dominant, the fact of the
matter is that American legislatures have effectively conceded the power
of flexible policy determinations in most conflicts problems to the
courts. Judges, in the exercise of that power, have a responsibility not
only for the implementation of local state policy but also for the healthy
functioning of that federalism to which their own states are committed.
The problems of multistate policies inherent in federalism must lead
them inevitably to the weighing of co-ordinate state interests, and the
question is no longer whether, but how shall they do so.
I recognize all too well that such a conclusion is not an exit, but a
threshold. How are interests to be identified, measured, and the process
Cf. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAw § 107 (1968).
39. In fact some of the more significant statutory rules, however imperfectly they may
be drafted, seem designed precisely with a view toward preserving flexible judicial
determination. E.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-105.
38.
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of doing so articulated? As our preoccupation once shifted from particular contacts to the quantity of contacts, so also has it now moved on to
the more rational objective of qualitative evaluation. The enormous
task which this objective opens before us will occupy both courts and
scholars for many years to come. This ending is scarcely the place to
further explore the beginning of that task, but I cannot refrain from
mentioning one fascinating problem raised by the wry comment of
Justice Roberts, dissenting in Cipolla. "Naturally," he said, "it is always
difficult to read the legislative mind, and courts have discovered a host
of reasons for guest statutes. ' 40 Has our venture into qualitative evaluation, coupled with the poor quality of legislative history materials in
most states, already led us to judicial fabrication of policies to justify
the assertion of forum interests? Should the practice of pouring new
policy wine into old statutory bottles, so often employed in domestic
law interpretation, be carried with equal vigor to the determination and
measurement of state interests? Perhaps somewhat greater restraint
should be exercised in the area of conflict resolution, 41 especially when
the task before the court involves the determination and evaluation of
a foreign state's interest. To pursue the thought of Justice Roberts,
perhaps an initial step in multistate cases should be to inquire whether
a newly articulated policy has been the unwitting guest of a host statute,
uninvited and never entertained by the legislative mind.
40. 267 A.2d at 857.
41. But cf. Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28
(1963).
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